ABSTRACT Economics, social psychology, and management studies suggest that group identity plays an important role in directing employee behaviors. On the one hand, strong group identity could motivate high effort to resolve conflicts of interests in the workplace. On the other hand, it could encourage conformity toward group norms. We examine whether the effect of group identity is conditional on managers' performance reporting choices. Drawing on survey and archival data from a field site, we find that when performance transparency is low, the interest alignment effect is more salient and group identity positively relates to employee performance. However, when performance transparency is high, the conformity effect is more salient and higher group identity is associated with more homogeneous, but not necessarily higher, employee performance. Our findings contribute to the management control literature by documenting that managers' performance reporting choices determine whether group identity has positive effects on employee performance. Data Availability: Data in this study are derived from a proprietary source.
ABSTRACT We investigate whether CEO power influences a firm's decision to change its compensation system in response to regulatory and public pressure. In particular, we assess whether CEO power influences the choice of performance measures as a form of camouflage to minimize the impact of these reforms on their wealth. We examine one component of CEO pay, namely, the use of performance-vested stock option (PVSO) plans, and find that firms with powerful CEOs attach less challenging targets in the initial PVSOs granted to their CEOs. Such firms also appear to adopt PVSO plans early, and are more likely to do so when faced with public outrage over executive compensation. Our results suggest that powerful CEOs attempt to appease public outrage by quickly adopting PVSOs, but that adopting PVSOs early does not appear to be an optimal strategy for increasing shareholder value. Regulators intended that implementation of PVSOs would be beneficial to shareholders by improving the link between CEO pay and firm performance. However, our results indicate that powerful CEOs can negate some of the beneficial effect of PVSOs through their influence on adoption and choice of performance targets. Data Availability: All data used in this study are publicly available from the sources indicated in the paper .
ABSTRACT This study explores how initial control choice influences the ease with which outsourcing firms switch suppliers. We recognize that firms invest in controls to manage collaborative relationships, and argue that these investments generate switching costs, namely, opportunity and reinvestment costs. We collect data on outsourcing transactions by conducting semi-structured interviews across multiple field sites. Observed patterns across 53 cases show that firms with trust-based controls experience the most difficulty in switching suppliers, whereas firms with market-based controls experience the greatest ease. Firms with bureaucratic-based and hybrid controls generally lie between these extremes. Furthermore, in nearly 50 percent of our sample (25 cases), respondents indicate that the switching costs associated with control choices increase the difficulty of switching suppliers. We also find evidence that the magnitude and nature of switching costs vary with the types of controls chosen. Data Availability: Data used in this study cannot be made public due to confidentiality agreements with participating firms .
We investigate two determinants of two choices in the control system of divisionalized firms, namely decentralization and use of performance measures. The two determinants are those identified in the literature as important to control system design: (1) information asymmetries between corporate and divisional managers and (2) division interdependencies. We treat decentralization and performance measurement choices as endogenous variables and examine the interrelation among these choices using a simultaneous equation model. Using data from 78 divisions, our results indicate that decentralization is positively related to the level of information asymmetries and negatively to intrafirm interdependencies, while the use of performance measures is affected by the level of interdependencies among divisions within the firm, but not by information asymmetries. We find some evidence that decentralization choice and use of performance measures are complementary.