This study aims to shed light on the determinants and consequences of the revolving door at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). While revolvers may be good monitors due to their SEC experience and, thus, continuously create benefits for the economy ("schooling"), it is possible that they exploit their insights into the enforcement process and private connections to undermine enforcement ("regulatory capture"). Using a newly created dataset of revolvers who moved from the SEC to company boards, this study shows that not all revolvers are appointed for the same reasons and create the same benefits for their new employers. I demonstrate that those revolvers most closely involved in the enforcement process are associated with fewer future enforcement actions while accounting quality does not improve. Contrarily, external revolvers seem to use their monitoring and advising duties to improve accounting quality.
Skip Nav Destination
Close
Article navigation
Research Article|
September 30 2020
The SEC's Revolving Door: Insights from Boards of Directors
Juliane B. Wutzler
Juliane B. Wutzler
Search for other works by this author on:
Accounting and the Public Interest API-19-005.
Article history
Received:
March 24 2019
Accepted:
April 28 2020
Citation
Juliane B. Wutzler; The SEC's Revolving Door: Insights from Boards of Directors. Accounting and the Public Interest doi: https://doi.org/10.2308/API-19-005
Download citation file:
Close
Sign in
Don't already have an account? Register
Client Account
You could not be signed in. Please check your email address / username and password and try again.
Sign in via your Institution
Sign in via your Institution
23
Views
0
Citations