International Mutual Aid: Enhanced Use of Joint Contingency Plan Authority for Mutual Aid Spill Response Across an International Border Pays off in SONS 2010 Exercise and in Deepwater Horizon Response

Canada and the United States have a long history of preparing for pollution response at their shared maritime border, with treaties that addressed water usage and quality dating as far back as the Boundary Waters treaty of 1908 (International Joint Commission, 2010). This mutual interest in boundary waters led to the creation of a Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan (JCP) in 1974 as called for by the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972. When amended in 1983, the agreement called for four additional operational plans to expand the joint response readiness across the maritime border of the two nations. Pursuant to this amendment, the Geographic Annex for the Atlantic border (CANUSLANT plan) was first signed in 1983 and has since been regularly improved upon and exercised on a two to three year cycle. In 2003, the JCP was revised to incorporate changes in both domestic U.S. and Canadian pollution response regimes, which expanded the international basis of the JCP by incorporating provisions of the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (CCG and USCG, 2003).

During the recurring preparations to exercise the plans under this continuing relationship, the involvement of a major national exercise in the area forced exercise planners to revisit their approach. Coast Guard Sector Northern New England and the First District are the primary U.S. Coast Guard units involved in the routine implementation of the Canada-U.S. Atlantic (CANUSLANT) exercise and plan. As initial objectives for the CANUSLANT 2009 exercise were in development, members of these units were notified that the SONS 2010 exercise would be conducted within their respective jurisdiction. A SONS exercise is conducted triennially across the nation to test the pollution response system from top to bottom at its largest scale. Furthermore, this particular SONS exercise was the first to be held as a National Exercise Program Tier II exercise, thus it focused on U.S. Government strategy, policy, and procedural issues meriting priority for national and regional Federal interagency participation. The choice of this area for a SONS exercise clearly called for an adjustment to the CANUSLANT 2009 exercise plans.

As discussion proceeded for both the CANUSLANT and SONS exercise, it was clear that some of the key objectives did not easily lend themselves to a fully combined exercise. Given the infrequency of testing across multiple Coast Guard Captain of the Port Zones (Sectors) under the Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP), the First District had a strong desire to test this aspect of domestic response – a major discharge that impacts multiple states and multiple sectors. Given approximately 250 linear miles between the southwestern and northeastern coastal boundaries of Sector Northern New England, there was no realistic single scenario that would challenge both ends of this zone over the expected two day exercise duration. Other options were discussed in the early phase of exercise design, such as a dual-incident scenario that simultaneously challenged both ends of the zone. However, the preferred approach that emerged was a 2009 CANUSLANT tabletop that explored the JCP contribution to a SONS spill in the Portland area to better facilitate U.S./Canada connections in the later 2010 SONS exercise that principally had domestic U.S. impacts. This approach would allow for a focused study of the JCP linkages in a large discharge distant from the border while still emphasizing the desired multi-Sector, multi-State response in the U.S. This possible mutual aid focused exercise would be a novel exercise for CANUSLANT, as all past others have ultimately threatened the border in some shape or form.

Several past experiences in the northeast provided incentive to think more broadly about the applicability of the JCP for incidents beyond those impacting the immediate the border. One example is in the Marine Environmental Response arena, and another is in Search and Rescue.

In May 2005, the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) sought use of the U.S. Coast Guard's (USCG) Viscous Oil Pumping System (VOPS) to address the removal of bunker oils from a freighter that grounded in a storm in northeastern New Brunswick, Canada in early 2005 after a protracted period of remaining dead ship at a pier. This VOPS system had been designed following a Canadian and United States Coast Guard's Research and Development program joint research effort to evaluate skimmers and pump these high viscosity products, some higher than 1,000,000 centiStokes, based upon the lessons of the 1998 NEW CARISSA response in 1999. This joint research program provided USCG and Canadian Coast Guard response specialists adequate time to work together and build both response resources and relationships that would soon be beneficial. Suitable viscous oil pumping systems were not commercially available at the scale needed by the CCG to address the bunkers aboard an abandoned 6,400 dwt Roll-on Roll-off cargo ship, the SANTA EMMA, that severed its lines in a storm and stranded in Cape Tormentine, New Brunswick. The CCG was challenged in accessing the ship's tankage with its larger framed GT-185 pumps. To address the threat of a spill of heavy fuel in an area fraught with fishery and environmental issues, the CCG required the more streamlined DOP-250 pumps in the USCG inventory with the VOPS annular ring to facilitate viscous product pumping (see Drieu, 2003).

Cape Tormentine, New Brunswick is on the province's northeastern shore within the Gulf of Saint Lawrence and therefore well outside of the Atlantic contiguous waters covered by the Joint Contingency Plan (CCG and USCG, 2003). The process for requesting the support followed two paths: first an informal one based upon the direct working relationship between the CCG and USCG members of the VOPS research project, and second, a formal one involving CCG and USCG headquarters. The regional entities conferred about the response strategy early in the process. However, due to the existing VOPS relationship and the location far outside the contiguous waters of the JCP, both sides agreed that the JCP and its processes were inapplicable. On April 29th, 2005, calls between the heavy oil pumping project leaders initiated cross border mobilization of USCG personnel from the Coast Guard Gulf Strike Team in Alabama to assist in removal of cold bunker from the deep and double bottom tanks. After 15 days of efforts, the vessel was stripped and towed away for scrap. The resources were mobilized based upon the VOPS development relationship, while the formal request lagged behind the mobilization because this type of international support did not fall under the pre-arranged and rapid approach of that which is routinely exercised under the JCP. One of the lessons from this incident is the benefit of leveraging both authorities and relationships stemming from the JCP agreement. While the International Maritime Organization International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990, known as OPRC 1990, provides for mutual support among signatory nations, it has typically not been exercised as a matter of routine as the cross-border JCP, nor is the authority for activation delegated to the extent that it is within the JCP thus requiring much higher level national-level coordination.

Later that same year, in August of 2005, as Hurricane Katrina threatened the Gulf of Mexico Coast, expansive use and interpretation of a trilateral search and rescue agreement between the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada helped to save lives in New Orleans. The United States-United Kingdom-Canada Search and Rescue trilateral agreement is both used and exercised, resulting in the formation of strong relationships between the search and rescue communities in the three nations. This benefit was recognized during the Hurricane Katrina response, whereby the chief of Search and Rescue for the First Coast Guard District was able to provide helicopter support from the First District by backfilling the ready rescue helicopter at Air Station Cape Cod with a Canadian Forces helicopter.

These examples demonstrate the strong partnership across multiple missions between the U.S. and Canada, and highlight the importance of building such support into contingency plans to the maximum extent authorized.

While “mutual aid” is not referred to within the JCP with that specific terminology, the document does contain sufficient authority for this function in regions with broadly defined contiguous waters (such as the Great Lakes or the Atlantic region).

The JCP provides broad overarching guidance on coordinating a response involving both nations' pollution response regimes. It is a highly general document, delegating most of the work to the Geographic Annexes to define the process that will be used to facilitate an efficient and effective response in the contiguous waters which the document defines for each geographic annex (CCG and USCG, 2003). The critical element of the JCP that supports the concept of mutual aid is the assistance provision, found in section 801.2: “Unless agreed otherwise, the costs for any assistance provided in the contiguous waters that fall under a requesting party's jurisdiction shall be borne by the requesting party.”

The broad definition of the Atlantic contiguous waters is also advantageous to consideration of employing the JCP assistance clause within this region. The Atlantic contiguous zone consists of “those waters of and along the Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of Maine seaward to Latitude 40° 27′ 05″ N, Longitude 65° 41′ 59″ W [the outermost point of the Hague line defining the U.S./Canada Atlantic ocean boundary], thence north along a bearing of 000° T to the Canadian shoreline.” This is a broad expanse of water, as the Gulf of Maine is bounded by Cape Cod to the South and extends up through the Bay of Fundy to the southwestern tip of Nova Scotia.

The JCP assigns to the USCG Districts and CCG regions the responsibility to plan for efficient and effective response in this area. Further it provides for the request and provision of assistance at the expense of the requestor. Finally, the JCP assigns the details of JCP implementation to the Geographic Annexes. Nothing in the JCP specifically requires a discharge to impact both nations, as the threat to the contiguous waters by definition is of concern to both. Because of this set of facts, USCG First District and CCG Maritimes region agreed there was sufficient authority inherent in the JCP for inclusion of greater detail on mutual aid in the Atlantic Geographic Annex and to exercise this concept more thoroughly.

The coincidental timing of CANUSLANT 2009 and SONS 2010 provided the opportunity to further test and refine the concept of use of the assistance provision in the JCP for mutual aid purposes in a very large major discharge in the Portland, Maine area.

Rather than fully combine CANUSLANT 2009 and SONS 2010, or carry them out in an unassociated manner, the CANUSLANT exercise was redefined as workshop-based exercise that was a precursor to SONS 2010. This workshop utilized the SONS scenario to explore multiple aspects of the Canada-U.S. interface and interaction during a SONS event within the Gulf of Maine (specifically, Portland ME) despite the fact that this spill would not threaten Canadian waters in the short term.

The day and a half workshop consisted of multiple introductory information sharing presentations, four topical breakout groups, and outcome reporting in a plenary session. This paper focuses on the work of the Mutual Aid workgroup, which contemplated specialized resources that would benefit from cross-boundary use in a significant incident. There were three additional workgroups that focused on fisheries and wildlife, health and safety, and commercial equipment and services (i.e., Oil Spill Removal Organization / Response Organization, Salvage, Lightering).

The mutual aid workgroup focused on the government-to-government support that could be facilitated under the auspices of the JCP in a spill occurring away from the border but still within the defined contiguous waters; the SONS scenario presented a spill of sufficiently substantial proportions to warrant both resource requests and fulfillment among both nations. The following desired end states and objectives were assembled by the CANUSLANT design team for the mutual aid workgroup (CCG and USCG, 2010):

• Desired end states:

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    A process exists to access specialized resources in the contiguous waters in a timely manner.

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    The process for contracting and funding exist and is documented in the plan.

• Workgroup Objectives:

  • ○

    Confirm the suitability of the Joint Contingency Plan for mutual aid.

  • ○

    Describe procedures for mutual aid.

  • ○

    Identify areas where government can facilitate Responsible Party (RP) response efforts that involve the border (CCG and USCG, 2010).

Most of the discussion in the mutual aid workgroup focused on particular specialized resources possessed chiefly by one of the two nations, rather than the core pollution response equipment and services that could be provided domestically. The DWH response showed that even basic response capability may need to flow globally during catastrophic-scale responses.

Two particular examples of specialized resources garnered the most attention during the mutual aid discussions. For Canadian support to the U.S., the National Aerial Surveillance Program's (NASP) multiple maritime surveillance aircraft. These aircraft have specialized pollution surveillance equipment and were viewed as a specialized resource that did not have a comparable source in the U.S. from either the government or industry. For U.S. support to Canada, the maritime hazardous materials response capability within the U.S. Coast Guard's National Strike Force was seen as an important specialized capability that lacked an equivalent north of the border. Because of the later involvement of NASP in the SONS 2010 exercise and extensive employment during the DWH response, additional detail on this resource is provided below.

Transport Canada's National Aerial Surveillance Program (NASP) is one of the pillars of Transport Canada's environmental prevention program. As such, Transport Canada improved the effectiveness of the NASP by upgrading its remote sensing equipment, almost doubling its flight hours, and expanding to areas not previously flown in Canada. The recent addition of the state of the art remote sensing equipment, referred to as the Maritime Surveillance System (MSS6000), has made Canada a leader in the field of Marine Aerial Reconnaissance. The MSS6000 is designed to facilitate surveillance of all types of activities on the sea surface; however, it is ideally suited to monitor marine pollution on the ocean surface.

The NASP capabilities to detect, analyze, record, and report marine pollution is unmatched in North America. In 2004, Transport Canada realized that there was a need to acquire a proven and readily available system for rapid installation. In December 2006, the first of three systems was commissioned and are proving to be very able additions to Canadian capability.

Transport Canada now owns and operates three pollution surveillance aircraft strategically positioned across the country as follows:

• Dash 8 – Moncton, NB – Conducts pollution surveillance, marine security patrols and ice reconnaissance in the Ontario, Quebec and Atlantic regions.

• Dash 8 – Vancouver, BC – Conducts pollution surveillance and marine security patrols in the Pacific region.

• Dash 7 – Ottawa, ON – Conducts pollution surveillance, marine security patrols and ice reconnaissance in the arctic and over Canada's Great Lakes.

Transport Canada has chosen to take a different approach regarding pollution prevention activities than that of the USCG when it comes to maritime surveillance by continually conducting overt patrols, which act as a deterrent to potential polluters in waters under Canadian jurisdiction. The USCG's pollution prevention activities, however, have focused on a mix of sizeable enforcements or settlements with owners or operators that have evidence of illegal overboard discharges as well as our routine multi-mission aerial patrols.

Transport Canada's NASP aircraft have the capacity to fly over 3,600 hours per year. However, their operating budget allows for approximately 2,000 to 2,200 hours. As a result, Transport Canada is actively seeking other partners to fully utilize their aircraft, perhaps including potential acquisition of hours for surveillance in contiguous waters between Canada and the USA.

The SONS exercise presented Transport Canada with an opportunity to demonstrate how the aircraft could be used to respond to a rare catastrophic incident that exceeded response capabilities at local and regional levels within the U.S. The initial scope of the NASP involvement in the SONS exercise included having the aircraft conduct a staged pollution patrol over scenario's oiled area, followed by a demonstration of NASP surveillance capability for the USCG and other VIPS at the Portland airport. Unfortunately, upon arriving in the area it was determined that the weather was not conducive for a patrol as originally planned. However, the Marine Aerial Reconnaissance Team (MART) still provided typical sample data from the tarmac to the Incident Command Post that could be provided during a real incident. This information proved to be relevant and well received by the exercise participants. The data gave a good representation as to what could be provided if a real catastrophic incident was ever to occur in contiguous waters. On the second day of the exercise, the NASP aircraft and crew were made available at the local airport to allow representatives of the USCG and other agencies to view the remote sensing capability on the Dash 8. In total, over 25 people took the opportunity to view the aircraft.

As with any exercise, the networking between different agencies was invaluable. The contacts made during that time resulted in a working relationship being created between the USCG and Transport Canada headquarters representatives. It was these linkages that facilitated the rapid deployment of the NASP to support the USCG and BP in the DWH Incident.

On April 30, 2010, 8 days after the sinking of the DEEPWATER HORIZON, Transport Canada received a request for assistance from the USCG and BP for provision of aerial surveillance and reconnaissance services in support of the incident. In order to simplify contractual matters, it was requested that Transport Canada enter into negotiations and an agreement with BP directly rather than going through the USCG. This simplified the approval process and allowed for a rapid deployment of the NASP to Houma.

On May 1, 2010, Transport Canada deployed its Moncton based Dash 8 aircraft & 13 personnel (7 Transport Canada and 6 Environment Canada) for an initial period of 2 weeks. This was extended 5 times resulting in a 10-week deployment. The NASP conducted its first patrol on May 2, 2010. From May 3 to May 11, 2 flights per day were scheduled. It was quickly determined that this was extremely taxing on the limited crews deployed to the incident and, as a result, on May 12, the scheduled flights were reduced to 1 per day.

In total, the NASP flew 298 hours in support of the incident before being replaced by the Icelandic Coast Guard on July 15, 2010. While Canada reduced its domestic aerial surveillance for a period, the NASP provided outstanding service to BP and the USCG in the response utilizing its SLAR capability to fill an important spot between tactical and strategic sensors and returned to Canada with enhanced experience and lessons.

As previously mentioned, the USCG requested that Transport Canada work directly with BP to solidify a contract for services. The important Contiguous Zone factor, that was a key element of discussion in the CANUSLANT 2009 and SONS 2010 exercises, to call upon a foreign government resource was mitigated due to the ability of Transport Canada to arrange the deployment as a commercial transaction under contract, specifically arranged as a purchase order with the spill management team.

Transport Canada prepared a Letter of Understanding listing the terms and conditions for the requested work, which was later signed by both parties and resulted in the issuance of a purchase order. This was the first time that Transport Canada was hired by private industry on a full cost recovery basis, avoiding the Government-to-Government paperwork and process challenges allowed for a rapid deployment of the NASP to Houma. Within 1 day the aircraft and crew were deployed to the scene of the incident.

Aerial surveillance was considered a critical coordination mechanism during response operations. Daily missions were required to keep up with the rapidly changing location and condition of surface oil. Transport Canada's Dash 8 was the only aircraft providing Side Looking Airborne Radar imagery of the spill site from May 2 to July 15. The mapping swath width of the sensing platform made this the only aircraft in the middle range between the tactical aircraft support and the strategic satellite sensors. Its main tasks were to:

• Map the spatial extent of the oil spill;

• Alert in-situ burn and dispersant teams to fresh oil through the Command Post Liaison;

• Direct skimmers to the heavy oil as eyes on oil meant boats on oil when it was operationally possible to do so. Surveillance increased the speed, accuracy and efficiency in response in dispatching vessels during the next operational period;

• Classify the oil in accordance with internationally defined oil codes; and

• Provide real-time photos and location data to the Incident Command Posts.

As it related to aerial reconnaissance, the NASP had an advantage of both experienced crew and mission-specific equipment. This proved to be very useful to the Command Team during the 10-week deployment of the NASP.

The experienced equipment operators, liaisons, and spotters had the ability to distinguish actual oil on the water from seaweed, shadows, or other “spots” of environmental phenomena to avoid misdirection of resources. Furthermore, the crews were able to intercept the oil and report it in near real time by providing imagery to the Command Posts. The aircraft maintenance engineers were able to troubleshoot problems that could have kept the aircraft from being serviceable. Quick turnarounds were essential in ensuring a good quality of service. Lastly, the pilots had previous operational experience working with the equipment operators and were able to ensure the flight tracks were flown in a manner that ensured the highest quality of data. This was often challenging considering the local weather conditions forecasted during the hurricane season in Louisiana.

The MSS6000 was purchased by TC to both deter polluters as well as provide a sensor during spill response. The deployment of state-of-the-art remote sensing equipment enabled the NASP to:

• Obtain images and positive location of oil. Data from the NASP patrols was given priority by first responders as it provided near real time photos and slick position data to the command post;

• Ground truth (calibrate) satellite imagery with side-looking aerial radar (SLAR);

• Supplement visual field observations to improve the ability to distinguish the skimmable or burnable heavy oil from the sheen which was left to evaporate;

• Generate up-to-date and significantly more accurate operating picture for response crews. The establishment of near real time communications linkages between the Dash 8 and the Command team was paramount.

On July 14 and 15, the NASP handed over the operation of SLAR reconnaissance to the ICG. While in transit to Louisiana, the ICG stopped in Moncton, N.B. to meet the Canadian Dash 8 crews and receive a briefing on the operations. Overall, the transition went very well whereby pertinent information was shared between the two groups. IGC representatives were pleased to receive this response experience while supporting the response efforts.

Because of the success of the CANUSLANT 2009 workshop, and the endorsement of the use of the Joint Contingency Plan for mutual aid for responses within the contiguous waters, the USCG and CCG improved the Atlantic Geographic Annex (AGA) treatment of the mutual aid concept. The AGA version was signed on June 29, 2010 and addresses mutual aid more explicitly than the prior 2004 version.

Citing the assistance provision of the JCP, the AGA now highlights the provision of mutual aid across the border as one of the objectives of this regional plan. The Activation and Coordination of Response flowchart for the plan (See Figure 1) was reworked to ensure that mutual aid resource support is included as a trigger point for CANUSLANT notifications and plan activation, and resource provision or resource sharing is an explicit consideration in CANUSLANT activations.

In addition to these plan changes, the cross-border response team participants have been sharing additional information regarding specialized resources that might be utilized for mutual aid support, with consideration being given to further incorporating such resources into the Atlantic Geographic Annex. Examples of this information sharing include presentations on the Canadian National Aerial Sensing Program at Joint Response Team meetings and sharing of National Strike Force capabilities lists with Canadian colleagues.

Additional work remains to be done to pre-arrange funding/contracting mechanisms for such deployments, as the cross-border deployment of government resources can pose some complexities depending on how such resources are activated and funded; the JCP does not dictate a specific reimbursement mechanism and the history of JCP activation is limited. Further exploration of international resource sharing specifics is warranted to address this issue across the OPRC signatory nations to address resource shortfalls that arise during worst-case events or in resource constrainted areas such as the Arctic.

Numerous lessons have been learned through the DWH response; however, there are several of particular relevance to this paper topic. First, international resource provision is an important topic that will gain greater focus following this incident. The BP Lessons Learned report emphasizes the importance of international resources, which it captures under Lesson 1, which focuses on the importance of collaboration, noting that no fewer than 19 countries contributed to the response (BP, 2010).

The coincidental timing of the CANUSLANT and SONS 2010 exercises allowed the response communities involved in the Atlantic U.S. and Canada to think about resource sharing in a major spill experienced by the other. The focus on specialized resources within the mutual aid working group during the workshop-based CANUSLANT 2009 exercise allowed for the discussion of areas where areas of particular investment yielded advanced capability. The fact that one of the key capabilities discussed in CANUSLANT 2009, deployed in SONS 2010, was requested and supported the DWH spill from early May through late July was testament to the applicability of the Canada-U.S. mutual aid concepts explored in the CANUSLANT-SONS exercise sequence.

Most of the discussion of this concept in this exercise sequence related to those specialized and advanced resources, as there was a level of comfort among the response community that, aside from the immediate border area, internal cascading of basic oil spill resources would alleviate the need for any significant cross-border resources that existed within both nations' inventories. The scope and scale of the DWH response did result in global acquisition of a wide variety of response resources (BP, 2010). Further attention in Canada-U.S. and broader international response preparedness could better structure the global government and private response community for requesting and providing these resources.

In addition to the broader global resource issues that arose in DWH, there is further work to be done within the Atlantic region to continue improvement in this area. First, the JCP describes the Joint Response Team (JRT) as principally an advice and council body for the On-Scene Coordinator/Commander (OSC). Broadening this definition within the Atlantic Geographic Annex, at a minimum, will better recognize the JRT agencies for their resource provision role to the OSC. This is important, as one of the issues that has arisen with Transport Canada (TC) as the operator of the NASP, is the mechanism whereby TC would support a JCP response, as only the CCG is signatory in Canada; the results of research regarding this mechanism and authority will inform future Atlantic Geographic Annex refinement. Furthermore, the DWH response has prompted additional discussion of the management of an exploration or production related discharge in Canada and any possible cross-border implications; the Offshore Petroleum Boards have authority over spills, but the cross-border marine contingency plans belong to the Canadian Coast Guard, presenting another possible topic for exploration in future contingency planning and exercises.