ABSTRACT
Zhang, H.; Tang. L., 2019. A Nash equilibrium game model for seafood safety regulation. In: Gong, D.; Zhu, H., and Liu, R. (eds.), Selected Topics in Coastal Research: Engineering, Industry, Economy, and Sustainable Development. Journal of Coastal Research, Special Issue No. 94, pp. 818–822. Coconut Creek (Florida), ISSN 0749-0208.
To prevent the safety incidents from becoming serious, it is vital to find the root causes of the accidents. This paper expatiates the trading patterns of online-sold seafood and the resulting seafood safety situations. Then a brief overview of the existing related regulatory measures and current problems in online-sold food safety supervision is presented. On this basis, three subjects, including seafood producers, third-party platforms and consumers, are used to set the Nash equilibrium, analyzing the factors that can influence each related interest subject's strategy choice. The results show that the third-party platform is the most essential part in the safety supervision chain, and too much emphasis on regulating producers will only curb food safety incidents in the short term. Some suggestions are given to improve the safety supervision of online-sold seafood.
