In this study, we examine the effect of health information technology (HIT) investments on hospital bad debt via improved patient experience. Using data from California Hospital Reports and Definitive Healthcare, we first predict and find that HIT investments decrease hospital bad debt. Next, following Baron and Kenny's (1986) approach and the bootstrap approach of Zhao, Kynch, and Chen (2010), we study whether patient experience mediates the relationship between HIT investments and hospital bad debt. We find that HIT improves patient experience which, in turn, reduces bad debt at hospitals. Taken together, our findings provide evidence that patient experience is important as a means to affect the relationship between HIT investments and hospital bad debt.
ABSTRACT Lobbying is a primary avenue through which business organizations attempt to influence legislation, regulations, or policies. In this study, we examine the association between lobbying and hospital performance and find that the effects of lobbying activities on hospital performance vary according to the distinct types of hospital ownership. Specifically, we find that lobbying raises employee salaries in not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals, reduces uncompensated care costs in both for-profit and NFP hospitals, and increases return on assets (ROA) in for-profit hospitals. We also find that the effects of lobbying on employee salaries, uncompensated care costs, and ROA are not significant in government hospitals. Taken together, our findings suggest that NFP hospitals lobby to protect employees' interests, while for-profit hospitals lobby to maximize investors' interests. Our paper provides evidence to illustrate that the goals and effects of hospital lobbying vary according to hospital ownership types.